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Plaintiff brings action for sum of money due for gasoline sold and
delivered. Upon verdict being returned for the plaintiff, counsel
for the defendant aptly moved that he be allowed to poll the jury,
which motion was allowed over objection of defendant.
Defendant's counsel brought out in examination that at least one
juror had reached his verdict on a compromise. Motion to set
aside was allowed defendant and plaintiff appealed. Held: Court
erred in allowing counsel to conduct the poll and in permitting
examination to show the method by which the verdict was reached.
Columbus Oil Co. v. Moore.'
The right of either party to a poll of the jury, upon a timely request, is recognized in North Carolina as being guaranteed
by the constitution.! There is little doubt that this is true in
most jurisdictions, although some states leave it with the discretion of the trial court.' Difficulty may arise as in the principal
case as to the manner of conducting such poll. There it was said
that to allow counsel to question the jurors "would violate the
principle that no outside influence should be exerted upon the
jurors with respect to their verdict." This seems to proceed upon the assumption that an examination by counsel in open court
and under the direction thereof, with opposing counsel present,'
would influence the jury. But must we assume it to be impossible
for counsel to conduct a poll so as not to exert an influence upon
the jury? In Jackson v. State,' an Alabama case, we find the
court saying: "The clerk or the judge may propound the question, and it would not be erroneous for another to do so, but it
must be done under the direction of the court . . . . but (the
court) declined to allow defendant or his attorney to do the polling. In this there was no error."
It can hardly be said the
court in that case would have held it error had the trial court allowed counsel to conduct the poll. Furthermore, it expressly says
another besides court or clerk may conduct the poll.
Now if
another may do so, it is rather apparent that the counsel, under
the court's direction, would be a competent examiner. There is
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S. E. 879 (N. C., 1932).
2N. C. Const. Art. I, §§ 13, 19. See Culbreth v. Mfg. Co., 189 N. C. 208,
126 S. E. 419 (1925); State v. Young, 77 N. C. 498 (1877).
"State v. Daniel, 77 S. C. 53, 57 S. E. 639 (1907) ; State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn.
518 (1880); Commonwealth v. Costley, 118 Mass. 1 (1875).
'James v. State, 55 Miss. 57 (1877).
5147 Ala. 699, 41 So. 178 (1906).
uItalics, the writer's.
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no justifiable reason, no precedent given by the court in the principal case, except that it is the common practice to have the court
or clerk conduct the poll. Admittedly, this has weight, but it is
going a little far to hold examination by counsel reversible error.
The court's second, and seemingly secondary, ground for reversing the judgment here is that the questions propounded tended to impeach the jury. It is, of course, the general rule that
such cannot be done. But counsel here merely attempted to show
it was a compromise verdict. Does this divulge the. deliberations
of the jury? In one West Virginia case a compromise verdict
was, on writ of mandamus, ordered to be received and recorded.
There is other authority to the effect that when, on a poll, it is
shown the verdict was one of compromise the jury should be sent
back to reconsider
Certainly these courts were of the opinion
that the motives of the jury had not been disclosed. The fact remains, however, that the secrecy of the verdict should be preserved
and any attempt at impeachment of the jury strikes at the spirit
of a jury trial as presently conceived.
The great weight of
authority permits the result of the verdict alone to be ascertained;
and such is the case in Virginia
The juror should be free to
reach a result without being hampered with the thought of later
having to disclose his motives.
Considering these points the North Carolina court could very
easily have based the decision on the questions propounded rather
than on who propounded them. It was unnecessary to reverse
merely because someone other than the usual person conducted the
poll. So long as the integrity of the verdict is preserved there is
no apparent good reason why counsel should not be allowed to
do this.
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